The majority of quantum models of cognition are based on quantum physical reductionism. Since the brain is composed of quantum systems, one might try to use QM (as a physical theory) to describe such quantumlike features of mind as complementarity (which was well established in psychology long before creation of QM), "interference of minds" and recently even "mental nonlocality" (under the influence of the EPR-Bohr debate and recent results on Bell's inequality). Opposite to the traditional quantum reductionism, we present a quantum-like model of the brain functioning which is not related to the evident fact that the brain is composed of quantum systems. In our model the quantum-like brain is described by the mathematical formalism of QM. However, quantum-like features are generated on the macrolevel -from processing of information on two time scales: precognitive (the quick one) and cognitive (the slow one). Our basic postulate is that the brain operates with averages (encoding mental quantities -images, emotions, minds) of stochastic processes evolving on the precognitive scale and that these averages are computed approximately by using the mathematical formalism of QM. 
Introduction 1
The idea that the description of brain functioning, cognition, and consciousness could not be reduced to the theory of neural networks and dynamical systems (cf. Ashby (1952) , Hopfield (1982) , Amit (1989) , Bechtel and Abrahamsen (1991) , Strogatz (1994) , van Gelder (1995) , van Gelder and Port (1995) , Eliasmith (1996) ) and that quantum theory may play an important role in such a description has been discussed in a huge variety of forms, see e.g. Whitehead (1929 Whitehead ( , 1933 Whitehead ( , 1939 , Orlov (1982) , Healey (1984) , Albert and Loewer (1988, 1992) , Lockwood (1989 Lockwood ( , 1996 , Penrose (1989 Penrose ( , 1994 , Donald (1990 Donald ( , 1995 Donald ( , 1996 , Yasue (1992, 1994) , Bohm and Hiley (1993) , Stapp (1993) , Hameroff (1994 Hameroff ( , 1998 , Loewer (1996) , Hiley and Pylkkänen (1997) , Deutsch (1997) , Barrett (1999) , Khrennikov (1999 Khrennikov ( , 2000 Khrennikov ( , 2002 Khrennikov ( , 2003 Khrennikov ( , 2004 Khrennikov ( , 2006a , Hiley (2000) , Vitiello (2001) , Aerts, D. and Aerts S. (2007) , Conte et al. (2007) and literature thereby.
This idea that quantum mechanics might have some consequences for cognitive science and psychology was discussed at many occasions already by fathers of quantum theory. We can mention, for example, attempts of Niels Bohr to apply the quantum principle of complementarity to psychology (see A. Plotnitsky 2001 Plotnitsky , 2002 Plotnitsky , 2007 . We can also mention the correspondence between Pauli and Young about analogy between quantum and mental processes.
During the last 30 years it was done a lot for the realization of the very ambitious program of quantum reductionism. There were various attempts to reduce mental processes to quantum physical processes in the brain. Here we point out to fundamental works Hameroff (1994 Hameroff ( , 1998 and Penrose (1989 Penrose ( , 1994 Penrose ( , 2005 .
However, the quantum formalism provides essentially more possibilities for modeling of physical, biological, and social processes. One should distinguish quantum mechanics as physical theory and its formalism. In principle, there is nothing surprising that a formalism which was originally developed for serving to one special physical theory can be used in other domains of science. For example, we are not surprised that differential calculus which was developed to serve to classical Newtonian mechanics was later used in field theory, quantum mechanics, biology, economics. Nobody protests against applying the classical probability calculus (the Kolmogorov measuretheoretic model) to modeling of financial processes and so on. In the same way one might import into cognitive science and psychology the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics, even without trying to perform a reduction of mental processes to quantum physical processes.
To escape misunderstanding, we shall reserve notations classical and quantum for physics. And in applications outside physics we shall use notations classical-like (CL) and quantum-like (QL).
By using non-reductionist QL-models one can escape some fundamental problems arising in the quantum reductionist approach, e.g., the presence of the huge gap between the quantum (physical) and neurophysiological scales. However, the problem of coupling with physical reality could not be just forgotten. Suppose that the quantum processes in the brain as a physical system are not responsible for mental phenomena. The natural question arises: "What is then the mechanism (physical, chemical, biological) inducing the QL-rules of mental processing?" In the present paper we shall show that the temporal structure of the brain functioning could be responsible for the QLstructure of processing of mental information.
Our starting point is a series of works Khrennikov (2005a Khrennikov ( , b, 2006b on a new interpretation of quantum mechanics as a special representation of classical statistical mechanics. In such an approach the quantum formalism is merely a way of representation of information about systems (physical as well as biological). Suppose that we are not able to collect the complete set of information about a system (e.g., because of some restrictions for measurement procedures and technologies). In such a situation we may, nevertheless, try to create a model of phenomena which is based on ignorance of a part of information. By our interpretation the quantum formalism provides the consistent rules for such a modeling.
In this paper we shall apply methods developed in Khrennikov (2005a Khrennikov ( , b, 2006b , see appendix for a short presentation, to cognitive science and psychology. We are especially interested in the following fundamental question: How can such a QLprojection of information be realized in biological systems? We propose a model of processing of information in the brain which has the following distinguishing features:
a) It is quantum-like (QL). The brain uses the quantum rule (given by von Neumann trace formula) for calculation of averages for psychological functions. b) Those functions are considered as self-observations of the brain. c) The QL-representation has the temporal basis. The brain is a machine transferring time into cognition. d) Any cognitive process is based on (at least) two time scales: precognitive time scale (which is very fine) and cognitive time scale (which is essentially coarser). To couple our model to physiology, behavioral science, and psychology, we consider a number of known fundamental time scales in the brain. Although the elaboration of those scales was based on advanced experimental research, there are still many controversial approaches and results. The temporal structure of the brain functioning is very complex. As the physiological and psychological experimental basis of our QL-model we chosen results of investigations on one special quantal temporal model of mental processes in the brain, namely, Taxonomic Quantum Model -TQM, see Geissler et al (1978) , Geissler and Puffe (1982) , Geissler (1983, 85, 87,92) , Kompass (1999, 2001) , Geissler, Schebera, and Kompass (1999) . The TQM is closely related with various experimental studies on the temporal structure of mental processes, see also Klix and van der Meer (1978) , Kristofferson (1972, 80, 90) , Bredenkamp (1993) , Teghtsoonian (1971) . We also couple our QL-model with well known experimental studies, see, e.g., Brazier (1970) , which demonstrated that there are well established time scales corresponding to the alpha, beta, gamma, delta, and theta waves; especially important for us are results of Aftanas and Golosheykin (2005) , Buzsaki (2005) .
The presence of fine scale structure of firing patterns which was found in Luczak et al (2007) in experiments which demonstrated selfactivation of neuronal patterns in the brain is extremely supporting for our QL-model.
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Of course, not yet everything is clear in neurophysiological experimental research, see Luczak et al (2007) : "The way spontaneous activity propagates through cortical populations is currently unclear: while in vivo optical imaging results suggest a random and unstructured process Kerr et al (2005) , in vitro models suggest a more complex picture involving local sequential organization and/or traveling waves, Cossart et al (2003) , Mao (2001) , Ikegaya (2004) , Sanchez-Vives and McCormick (2000) , Shu, Hasenstaub, and McCormick(2003), MacLean (2005) ."
In any event our QL-model for brain functioning operates on time scales which are used in neurophysiology, psychology and behavioral science. This provides an interesting opportunity to connect the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics with theoretical and experimental research in mentioned domains of biology. We hope that our approach could attract the attention of neurophysiologists, psychologists and people working in behavioral science to quantum modeling of the brain functioning. On the other hand, our QL-model might stimulate theoretical and experimental research on temporal structures of the brain functioning.
Quantum-like processing of incomplete information
As was pointed out, in this paper we consider not the quantum mechanics -a special physical theory which is applicable for a special class of physical systems (so called quantum systems),-but its formalism -a special mathematical formalism for representation of information. The quantum formalism is a special way of processing of incomplete information. However, if information cut off were done occasionally, one would have a chaotic information picture. The quantum formalism provides a possibility to create a consistent processing through the information projection. Such a formalism was first time found in physics at the beginning of 20th century.
Of course, our interpretation of quantum mechanics -as an incomplete description of quantum systems -contradicts to the original views of Bohr, Heisenberg, Pauli, von Neumann, Dirac and many others who postulated that quantum mechanics is a complete theory: the wave function provides the complete representation of statistical information about a system, e.g., electron. However, our "incomplete information processing interpretation" might be sympathetic for Einstein, Schrödinger, De Broglie, Bohm, Margenau, Popper, and nowadays Marshal, Ballentine, De Baere, De Muynck, Santos, Khrennikov and many others; cf. also with Svozil, 2006. Even if the first application of processing of incomplete information on the basis of the quantum formalism was found in physics, there are no fundamental reasons to restrict its applications only to physics. We are interested in applications to cognitive sciences.
One might guess that the ability for the quantum-like (QL) processing of information was developed by biological organisms. From the very beginning of evolution biological organisms operated with huge information flows. They could create a representation of external world which was based on an information-projection such that cuts of information flows were done in a consistent way. In the process of evolution there could be developed the ability to work with information by using the QL-representation.
We start with physics and we consider two time scales Khrennikov (2006d) . One scale, we call it prequantum, is a fine time scale, another, we call it quantum, is a coarser time scale. Oscillations at the prequantum time scale are averaged and used for probabilistic reasoning at the quantum scale. The latter time scale is considered as an observational time scale.
It is important to mention that it was shown mathematically that one can really derive quantum averages as approximations of classical averages at the prequantum time scale, Khrennikov (2006d) .
In the conventional quantum mechanics for physical systems the two time scale representation has a "semi-subjective character." On the one hand, the quantum time scale -the atom time scale in Khrennikov On the other hand, the choice of the quantum (observational) scale and, hence, the concrete application of the quantum representation of information is a consequence of the presence of a special class of observershuman beings -and the special level of development of measurement technologies.
We now suppose that a biological system might create the QL-representation and QL-processing of information which are based on operating at two time scales. (1)
It provides a numerical measure of deviation of the QL (fuzzy, unsharp) representation of information from the "classical" (complete, sharp) one. Under the assumption that the precognitive time scale pc s is fixed, we find that for small periods of fluctuations c t the parameter κ is very large.
Thus higher frequencies (at the cognitive time scale) induce larger deviations from the (complete) CL-processing of information.
Huge amounts of information which are processed at the precognitive time scale are neglected, but not arbitrary (randomly). There is the QL-consistency in the information processing. Consequently, for low frequencies (oscillations with long periods) this coefficient is small. Therefore the QL-processing does not imply large deviations from the CLcomputational regime.
The crucial problem is to find those biological time scales which induce the QLrepresentation of information. There are many ways to create such time scales. We split the problem into the two parts: 1) to find the precognitive time scale; 2) to find the cognitive time scale.
It seems that (as in physics) the first problem is more complicated. First we consider the second one. We start the discussion on the choice of the cognitive time scale in by considering experimental evidences, see, e.g., Khrennikov (2006a) for discussion and references, that a moment in psychological time correlates with 100 ≈ ms of physical time for neural activity. In such a model the basic assumption is that the physical time required for the transmission of information over synapses is somehow neglected in the psychological time. The time (100 ≈ ms) required for the transmission of information from retina to the inferiotemporal cortex (IT) through the primary visual cortex (V1) is mapped to a moment of psychological time. It might be that by using c 100ms t =, we shall get the right cognitive time scale.
However, the situation is not so simple even for the second problem. There are experimental evidences that the temporal structure of neural functioning is not homogeneous. The time required for completion of color information in V4 ( 60 ≈ ms) is shorter that the time for the completion of shape analysis in IT ( 100 ≈ ms). In particular it is predicted that there will be under certain conditions a rivalry between color and form perception. This rivalry in time is one of manifestations of complex level temporal structure of brain.
Our fundamental assumption is that there exist various pairs of scales inducing various QL-representations of information. In the next section we shall discuss such a temporal QLmodel of cognition in more detail.
We shall come back to the "difficult problem, namely, determination of the precognitive time scale, in section 5. But at the moment we forget about physiological and psychological time scales in the brain and we present in more detail our QL-approach for processing of information.
Quantum-like approximation of temporal statistical averages in brain
There are two time scales, a precognitive time scale pc s and a cognitive time scale c t . There is a cognitive process π (e.g., a cognitive task) which is performed at the c t -scale. It integrates a number of processes which are performed at the pc s -scale. Here "integrate" has the meaning to produce averages with respect to oscillations at the pc s -scale. Such averages are considered as cognitive quantities at the level of the π -process.
In our model "self-observation" is nothing else than the calculation of an average. However, this is only a part of the story. If the brain were compute averages by the CLalgorithm -as statistical sums (with respect to huge ensembles of oscillations at the precognitive time scale) -then it would be simply an analogue of the ordinary computer. This would be a kind of "statistical physics thinking."
In our approach the QL-story of processing of information is in fact the purely computation story.
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To calculate averages as statistical sums (over huge neuronal ensembles), the brain should consume too much computational and, hence, physical resources. My guess is that the brain has the ability to perform calculations of averages by using the rules of quantum mathematical formalism. Instead of a huge statistical sum, the brain calculates its QL-approximation given by the von Neumann formula for the quantum average given by the operator trace, see von Neumann (1955) .
A classical mental quantity (psychological function) is given by a function () f ω depending on the vector of parameters ω which are produced at the precognitive time scale. In the QL-algorithm f is approximated by its second derivative, Khrennikov (2005a; 2005b; 2006b; 2006d) . In this way the brain obtains a symmetric operator A, Hessian of the map f . This is a QL-observable. A statistical distribution of random oscillations at the precognitive time scale is represented by its covariance operator. In this way the brain produces a symmetric positively defined operator. By scaling there is obtained the operator ρ which has all properties of the von Neumann density operator, i.e., it also has the unit trace. This is the QL density operator. After this the brain is ready to find the QL-approximation of the classical statistical average f <>:
We have shown in Khrennikov (2006d) that the classical average, the statistical sum with respect to the random oscillations at the time scale pc s , is approximated by the trace QL-average and the precision of the QL-approximation is of the magnitude κ which is given by (3). Thus if the parameter κ is very small the brain does not lose too much information. This is practically the CL-computation. But if κ is rather large, then the brain works in a nonclassical regime. One may say (as von Neumann would like) that in such a regime the brain uses nonclassical logic. Huge amounts of information are permanently neglected. But this does not generate a kind of chaos. Information is neglected in a consistent way.
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As was pointed out a few times, such a QL-processing of information save a lot of computational resources. It might be an important factor of the natural selection of biological organisms.
Multiplicity of time scales in brain and quantum-like cognitive representations
The main lesson from the experimental and theoretical investigations on the temporal structure of processes in brain is that there are various time scales. They correspond to (or least they are coupled with) various aspects of cognition. Therefore we are not able to determine once and for ever the cognitive time scale c t ("psychological time"). There are few such scales. We shall discuss some evident possibilities.
Before to go deeper in the temporal structure of mental processes, we shall analyze in more detail the multi-scale temporal aspects of quantum mechanics. Such aspects have never been discussed, because, on the one hand, it was commonly assumed that quantum mechanics is complete (this is the Copenhagen interpretation), and, on the other hand, the quantum formalism is used by only one class of observers -human beings. The latter generates the unique observational (quantum) time scale. clocks civilization is larger than the coefficient κ for our civilization). On the one hand, the superclocks civilization has a better possibility to find deviations of the incomplete quantum description from the complete classical description. However, there might be chosen a strategy to ignore such deviations and still use the quantum picture of the world. Even if it does not match precisely with the complete set of information about external world, it might be, nevertheless, convenient (by computational and consistency reasons) to proceed with the quantum pictures of reality. Similar functioning with a few time scales of observation (in fact, self-observation) can be present in the brain. How can we find those scales?
It is well known, see, e.g., Brazier (1970) , that there are well established time scales corresponding to the alpha, beta, gamma, delta, and theta waves. Let us consider these time scales as different cognitive scales. There is one technical deviation from the QL-scheme which was discussed above. We cannot determine precisely definite cognitive times corresponding to these scales. The scales are defined by ranges of frequencies and hence ranges of scaling times. The gamma scale is the finest and hence processes represented at this scale has the highest degree of QL-ness. On the other hand, we know that gamma waves patterns in the brain are associated with perception and consciousness. The beta scale is coarser than the gamma scale and it has less degree of QL-ness in processing of information. We know that beta states are associated with normal waking of consciousness.
The theta waves are even less QL than the alpha waves. They are commonly found to originate from occipital lobe during periods of relaxation, with eyes closed but still awake. They are involved into a representation of information with a high degree of classicality. And these rhythms are observed during some sleep states, and in states of quiet focus, for example, meditation, Aftanas and Golosheykin (2005) . However, there are also experimental evidences that the theta rhythms are very strong in rodent hippocampi and entorhinal cortex during learning and memory retrieval. We can just speculate that learning needs using of an essentially more detailed information representation. Thus learning (or at least a part of it) is less QL and hence more CL. The same we can say about memory retrieval. It also needs more complete, CL-representation of information. Large body of evidence, Buzsaki (2005) , indicates that theta-rhythms are used in spatial learning and navigation. Here we present the same reasons: such tasks are based on CLrepresentation of information.
Finally, we consider delta waves. Comparing with the highest scale -the gamma scale, the delta time scale is extremely rough. This induces a low degree of QL-ness. This is the state of deep sleep.
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Although we still did not come to the difficult problem, namely, determination of the precognitive time scale, we can, nevertheless, compare the degree of QL-ness of various time scales.
Our choice of the precognitive time scale will be motivated by so called Taxonomic Quantum Model, see Geissler et al (1978) , Geissler and Puffe (1982) , Geissler (1983, 85, 87,92) , Kompass (1999, 2001 ), Geissler, Schebera, and Kompass (1999) , for representation of cognitive processes in the brain (which was developed on the basis of the huge experimental research on time-mind relation, see also Klix and van der Meer (1978) , Kristofferson (1972, 80, 90) , Bredenkamp (1993) , Teghtsoonian (1971) . In the following section we recall briefly the main features of this model.
Taxonomic quantum model
There could be presented a portion of good criticism against starting from EEG bands. Indeed, this band structure is one of the few indications that directly point to behaviorally relevant physiological properties. Physiologists suggesting the definitions had a good intuition. However, that these definitions depend on behavioral information is shown by enormous individual differences in the band structures that can be defined only on a behavioral basis. To some degree this concerns also the general band structure. Because of individual differences, alpha is often restricted to the "common" range which is too short to be theoretically fully relevant. Definitions often go only from 9 to 12 Hz. Most careful investigators (earliest Livanov) defined the band by the range 7.5 to 13.5 Hz.
Therefore we propose to start with Taxonomic Quantum Model (TQM), Geissler et al (1978) , Geissler and Puffe (1982) , Geissler (1983, 85, 87,92) , Kompass (1999, 2001 ), Geissler, Schebera, and Kompass (1999) Bekesy (1936) . Of course, many of the functional statements of physiologists have the same basis. For our purpose, this statement is absolutely essential, because a coherent account of temporal properties of brain activity must not only be related to behavioral observations, but it must be based on temporal invariants extracted by a coherent theoretical account of behavioral observations, and only these can provide the guideline to find the proper physiological correspondences.
The best short cut to the approach is through the history of its emergence: The first impulse towards a taxonomic turn arose in the early 1970s from the discontent of Geissler, see, e.g., Geissler et al (1978) , with the fact that in simple psychophysical tasks data could indistinguishably be fitted to models resorting to widely differing, often enough even contradicting, assumptions. In his research in visual recognition, to circumvent this difficulty, Geissler introduced a technique of "chronometric cross-task comparison. " The main idea was to disambiguate models by temporal parametrization, thereby postulating invariance of time parameters under variation of stimulus parameters and task constraints (see e.g. Geissler et al. (1978) and Geissler and Puffe (1982) ). At that time another research group at the same institute did something similar by fitting latencies in standardized reasoning tasks to predicted numbers of operations, e.g., Klix and van der Meer (1978) . The estimates from the two lines of studies yielded a surprising picture: There seemed to exist small "bands" of operation times centering at around 55, 110 and 220 ms, thus exhibiting near-doubling relations. As a datum from the literature which fitted into this regularity the asymptotic value of 36.5 ms determined by Kristofferson (1972) , see also Kristofferson (1980, 90) , came to mind which up to the first decimal is 1/3 of 110 ms. Taken together, these four values suggested a system of "magic numbers". Herein a period of 110 ms represents something like a "prototype duration" from which the rest of periods derives by either integer division or multiplication. From various fit procedures for step lengths, Buffart and Geissler came up with an largest common denominator (l.c.d.) of 9.13 ms (see Geissler, 1985) showing a standard deviation of 0.86 ms across individuals. It turned out that the four above-mentioned periods, although partly many times larger than this small period, can be represented as integer multiples of it, with nearly absolute precision: 4913365691354812913 1096249132191 ×.=.;×.=.;×. =.;×.=.
. Of course, this might have been some strange coincidence. Yet, later, chronometric analysis seemed to support a modular unit of some 9 ms (see Geissler (1985) ; Puffe (1990); Bredenkamp (1993) . Further investigations justify a modified assumption about quantal graining: Regression yields the largest common denominator (l.c.d.) 4.6 ms, which is nearly exactly one half of 9.13 ms.
Note that, in terms of hypothetical quanta, a period of such duration represents the next smaller candidate of a "true" elementary "time quantum" which is compatible with the recognition data. In the following, let us adopt provisionally the ("ideal") value of 0 4565ms Q =. for this time quantum hypothesis.
The solution TQM offers to these seeming contradictions, see Geissler (1987, 92, 85) can be considered as a generalization or at least an analogue of the psychophysical principle of relative-range constancy. According to Teghtsoonian (1971) , this principle expresses itself in the fact that for all sensory continua, in terms of output magnitudes, the ratio of the largest to the smallest quantity is a constant of around 30. About the same value is obtained from the so-called Subjective Weber Law.
The generalization of the principle in the realm of quantal timing is the quantal-range constraint. To see how this analogue reads, consider first the assumed smallest period 0 Q . Thus QL-ness of processing of information increases. "Thinking through the alpha waves" is more likely processing of information by ordinary computer. Not so much information is neglected. Therefore the information processing is not so tricky: there is no need to manipulate with extremely incomplete information in the consistent way. "Thinking through the gamma waves" is similar to processing of information by an analogue of quantum computer -QLcomputer, see Khrennikov (2006a Here the difference between the biological QLprocessing of information in the brain and the CL-processing (as in models of artificial intelligence) is practically negligible.
We now compare our QL-scales of time with the "quantum scales" which were chosen in Khrennikov (2006d) : If we follow TQM in more detail then we should consider a possibility that in the brain there exist a hierarchy of precognitive times, i.e., the above model with one fixed precognitive time given by (3) was oversimplified. From the point of view of TQM each q Q given by (2) could serve as the basis of a precognitive time scale. We obtain a picture of extremely complex QLprocessing of information in the brain which is based of the huge multiplicity of various precognitive/cognitive scales.
In this framework the notion "precognitive" loses its absolute meaning. The notions "precognitive"/"cognitive" become relative with respect to a concrete psychological function (cognitive task). Moreover, a time scale which is precognitive for one psychological function can be at the same time cognitive for another. But the crucial point is that the same cognitive time scale, say c t , can have a number of different precognitive scales: induces its own QL-representation of information. Therefore the same c t -rhythm can be involved in the performance of a few different psychological functions. The final message from TQM is that the cognitive time c t scale should be based on an integer multiplier of the time quant 0 Q :
In such a model we can totally escape coupling with directly defined different EEG bands, alpha, beta, gamma,... We shall use only behaviorally defined time scales. The Weber law gives us the restriction to the value of the multiplier: 30 N ≤.
7. Appendix 1. On the properties of classical → quantum correspondence We define "classical statistical models" in the following way: a) physical states ω are represented by points of some set Ω (state space); b) physical variables are represented by functions f :Ω→R belonging to some functional space () V Ω; c) statistical states are represented by probability measures on Ω belonging to some class () S Ω; d) the average of a physical variable (which is represented by a function ()) fV ∈Ω with respect to a statistical state (which is represented by a probability measure ()) S ρ ∈Ω is given by
2.A classical statistical model is a pair () MSV =,.
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The conventional quantum statistical model with the complex Hilbert state space c Ω is described in the following way: a) physical observables are represented by operators One should not mix dequantization with so called deformation quantization. The fundamental principle of deformation quantization is so called correspondence principle. By this principle if one considers the Planck constant h as a small parameter then in the 0 h → quantum mechanics is transformed into classical mechanics on the finitedimensional phase space -classical mechanics of particles. In this framework quantum mechanics is considered as a theory which is more general ("precise") than classical mechanics of particles. Only by neglecting by actions of the Planck magnitude one can apply the classical description. If actions of the Planck magnitude are taken into account then the classical mechanical description of phenomena is not more valid. Classical predictions (for statistics of particles) can deviate from quantum predictions. The latter are considered as totally precise. Such deviations can be tested experimentally.
Another point (which is the crucial one) is that in the dequantization framework not quantum mechanics, but prequantum classical statistical model provides a better description of physical phenomena. The quantum description is only an approximative description. It can be applied only if one neglects by some small parameter (which is time scale parameter κ in this paper). By taking into account this parameter one obtains a better description of physical phenomena. Predictions of quantum mechanics should be violated. Those violations might be tested experimentally.
We remark that the procedure of dequantization does not contradict to the procedure of deformation quantization. (10) In fact, all "NO-GO" theorems (e.g., von Neumann, Kochen-Specker, Bell,...) can be interpreted as theorems about impossibility of various dequantization procedures. Therefore we should define the procedure of dequantization in such a way that there will be no contradiction with known "NO-GO" theorems, but our dequantization procedure still will be natural from the physical viewpoint. We define (asymptotic) dequantization as a family
of classical statistical models depending on small parameter 0 κ ≥. There should exist maps TSD κ :→ and s TVL :→ such that: a) both maps are surjections (so all quantum states and observables can be represented as images of classical statistical states and variables, respectively); b) the map s TVL :→is R -linear (we recall that we consider real-valued classical physical variables); c) the map TSD :→ is injection (there is one-to one correspondence between classical and quantum statistical states); d) classical and quantum averages are coupled through the following asymptotic equality: ∫
This equality can be interpreted in the following way. Let () f ψ be a classical physical variable (describing properties of microsystems -classical fields having very small magnitude ) κ . We define its amplification by:
(so any micro effect is amplified in 1 κ -times). Since κ gives intensity of vacuum fluctuations, the quantity f κ can be interpreted as relative intensity of f with respect to vacuum fluctuations. For such a relative intensity, we have:
Prequantum classical statistical theory
We choose the phase space QP Ω=×, where QPH == and H is real (separable) Hilbert space (finite or infinite dimensional). We consider Ω as the real Hilbert space with the scalar product This is a subalgebra of the algebra of bounded linear operators () L Ω. We also consider the space of symps () L , Ω consisting of self-adjoint operators. By using the operator J we can introduce on the phase space Ω the complex structure. Here J is realized as i −. We denote Ω endowed with this complex structure by cc QiP Ω:Ω≡⊕. We shall use it later. At the moment consider Ω as a real linear space and consider its complexification i Ω=Ω⊕Ω. 
∫
We point out that the trace is considered with respect to the complex inner product. We consider now the one parameter family of classical statistical models: Then the following asymptotic equality holds:
where the operator
where ()() Our basic postulate is that quantum formalism arises as the result of an approximation based on the time scaling Let us consider a "prequantum time scale" that is essentially finer than the quantum time scale. The latter is the time scale of measurements performed in experiments with quantum systems. The first one is the scale of very quick fluctuations which are invisible in modern experiments. We emphasize again that we consider QM as theory of observations. Therefore the quantum time scale is the scale of observations. Our terminology does not match with a rather common terminology by which the quantum time scale is associated with the Planck time. In our model the latter is one of possible candidates for the prequantum time scale.
We suppose that these two time scales can be coupled through a small scaling parameter 0 κ >. Denote the prequantum and quantum times by symbols s and t respectively. We suppose that: ts κ = (24) Here κ is a dimensionless parameter. It is assumed that 1 κ << (25) Thus the unit interval 1 s = of pre-quantum time corresponds to a small interval t κ = of 9 We recall that we proceed in the very general situation: Hilbert space can have the infinite dimension. Therefore one should be careful in mathematical assumptions. If the dimension is finite then, of course, any operator has the finite trace. 10 The later assumption is of geometric nature. It induces symplectic geometry and hence the corresponding complex structure on the state space. In such an approach to QM, we can proceed through expanding the right-hand side of (21) into series with respect to the scaling parameter 12 κ / . If we take () fV ∈Ω then by using the probabilistic notations we can repeat previous considerations on the asymptotic expansion of averages: EfW κκ . The difference between statistical predictions of QM and PCSFT is of the magnitude κ, where κ is the scaling parameter coupling the prequantum and quantum time scales, see (24). What is a magnitude of the time scaling factor κ ? This problem was discussed in very detail in Khrennikov (2006d) . In particular, the Planck time scale was considered as a major possible candidate for the prequantum time scale. However, such a choice was not sufficiently justified. The problem of justified choice of the prequantum time scale is still open.
